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Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, Confl ic t in Ukraine :  The Unwinding of
the Post-Co ld War  Order (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015). 240 pp. $24.95
Hardback.
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer’s book is not really about Ukraine but about
the West’s great power relations with Russia; indeed, the conclusions do not once
mention Ukraine. Menon and Rumer, as is true of  all International Relations
(IR) realists, are in awe with the relationship between power and politics where
“small” nations such as Ukraine are mere pawns. The conclusions ignore
Ukraine because they believe the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) will prioritise resuming normal relations with
Russia over enlargement to Ukraine. 
Russia’s continuous infringement of  the Minsk-2 Peace Accords and
annexation of  the Crimea rule out business as usual and the dropping of  sanc-
tions and Menon and Rumer ignore the possibility if  the accords were to col-
lapse of  their being Iranian-style sanctions and the flow of  arms to Ukraine. As
Prime Minister Stephen Harper said at the June 2015 G7 summit, Canada will
never agree to drop sanctions as long as the Crimea remains occupied (which
will continue as long as Vladimir Putin remains Russian president, which is likely
to be for life).
Realists are also always submitting to and warning of  Russia’s Weimar
problem, Moscow’s resentment at NATO and EU enlargement into an area of
“traditional Russian interests and domination” (71). Menon and Rumer’s pointing
out of  Russia’s resentment at not being invited to join NATO and the EU is
facetious as Moscow never asked to become a member. Realists ascribe limited
sovereignty to smaller countries such as Ukraine who are assigned roles of
buffers to appease the alleged sensitivities of  great powers that complain of
being marginalized (it is presumably okay to marginalise Ukraine) and in the case
of  Russia demand the West recognize the former USSR as its zone of  “privi-
leged interests” (73). Menon and Rumer never deem it important to ask
Ukrainians if  they wish to be included within Russia’s sphere of  influence and
fail to grasp that Russia had sought such a sphere since the early 1990s – long
before NATO and EU enlarged. Moscow sees not only the NATO military
alliance as a threat but even the EU whose integration into by Ukraine could not
in any way be viewed as a security threat. Just because Russia complains about
democracy promotion, which Canada undertakes as well as the US and EU
member states, it does not mean that Russia’s objectives are justified.
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The mistakes in the book are often a product of  Menon and Rumer
looking at Ukraine through Russian eyes. The Crimea can only be described as
“an indisputably Russian territory” (98) by denying its history prior to the late
eighteenth century – a racist misconception as mistaken as saying that North
America had no history prior to the arrival of  Europeans. Such a view of  Russia
ignores far longer history of  the Crimea within Turkic-Tatar history from the
thirteenth century. 
Menon and Rumer dwell on the likelihood of  the Donbas region of
Eastern Ukraine becoming a frozen conflict after ruling out the ability of
Ukrainian forces to regain the territory. Western arms flowing to Ukraine that
could change the battlefield balance of  power is never discussed as is the fact
that a Democratic or Republic successor to President Barack Obama will sup-
port the US Congress in sending arms (with Canada, UK, Poland and some
other countries following).
Another scenario the authors ignore is Kyiv-supported referendum
allowing the Donbas region to join Russia, as the separatists wish to do but
Putin does not because he wishes the region to remain inside Ukraine with a
veto over Kyiv’s policies. As throughout the book, Menon and Rumer assume
Ukraine should play by Russia’s rules.
Menon and Rumer, in the manner of  all newcomers to contemporary
Ukrainian affairs, fail to appreciate the radically changing internal dynamics in
the country (in the mid 1990s Rumer wrongly predicted Ukraine would disinte-
grate into two parts and now claim Ukraine is “fragmenting” [XI]). They adopt a
primordial Moscow-centric view of  Eastern-Southern Ukraine where language,
culture and identity allegedly are fixed in stone. In the course of  my seven
research visits to the region since the Euromaidan what is clear is that language
has little bearing on attitudes to Russia; after all, if  language were a marker of
identity then Canadians, Irish and Austrians would be Americans, English and
Germans respectively. Putin’s “New Russia” strategy to detach Eastern-Southern
Ukraine utterly failed. Russian-speaking soldiers, military and women civilian vol-
unteers rallied to Ukrainian patriotism throughout the region. Menon and Rumer
exaggerate the influence of  oligarchs and Kyiv’s inability to control “private
armies” (149) when all of  the volunteer battalions, which sprung up sponta-
neously with many coming from Euromaidan self  defence units, have been inte-
grated into the army and National Guard. 
Menon and Rumer’s weak understanding of  Ukraine’s internal dynamics
is also present in two other areas. They wrongly claim that Jews, Crimean Tatars
and Russians were “skittish” about Ukrainianisation (23), a statement that is only
true for the latter. Ukraine’s Jews and Tatars supported the Euromaidan and
today support the war against Russia. Also, domestic sources of  foreign orienta-
tions that have undertaken a radical transformation. Putin’s annexation of  the
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Crimea and hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine have reduced the pro-Russian 
constituency and today Ukrainian support for NATO and EU membership
stands at a record high of  nearly 50 and 60 per cent respectively.
Menon and Rumer repeatedly point to how the West did not see the
crisis coming or anticipate Russia’s moves “which at every step exceeded Western
expectations” (159). Towards this end, they argue for Western strategy to be
“built on a realistic understanding of  Russia rather than on what the West would
like it to be and hopes it will one day become” (162). Menon and Rumer are
right to question the naivety of  the “Russia reset” by the Obama administration
and the cozying up of  Germany, France, Italy, and other EU members to a
Russia transforming into an authoritarian and xenophobic anti-Western regime. 
At the same time, if  Western leaders were to accept the advice offered
by Menon and Rumer it would amount to an appeasement of  Russia’s interests
and a turn away from their core values. The seeds of  the Ukraine crisis are not
just in big power politics but also in Russian chauvinism towards its neighbours
that has always existed and which evolved into a coherent set of  aggressive poli-
cies over the last decade. Putin told President George W. Bush in 2008 “You
know George, Ukraine isn’t even a country” – a view that rules out any
Ukrainian leader agreeing to his country becoming a Russian buffer as this would
not be “Finlandization” but a vassal state. Therefore, unsurprisingly Menon and
Rumer fail to grasp how pro-Russian presidents of  Ukraine Leonid Kuchma and
Viktor Yanukovych (63) also had difficult relations with Moscow, even when in
the latter case they agreed to all Russian demands and nevertheless, Ukraine was
charged the highest gas price in Europe.
With an over-focus on big power politics Menon and Rumer miss the
bigger domestic picture and therefore their book fails to understand the sources
of  Ukraine’s conflict.
Taras Kuzio 
Canadian Institute of  Ukrainian Studies, University of  Alberta
James M. Pitsula, Keeping Canada Brit ish:  The Ku K lux Klan in  1920s
Saskatchewan (Vancouver: University of  British Columbia Press, 2013). 308
pp. $95.00 Hardback.
This well written, sprightly book offers a serious revision of  the role the Ku
Klux Klan played in Saskatchewan during the 1920s. It is dissociated from its
United States roots and quite thoroughly placed into mainstream Saskatchewan
history. It infers that its image as a fanatical group – that hooded, violent and
anti-Semitic group of  the US Klan – was the result of  campaign caricaturing by
the James Gardiner government. The KKK in Saskatchewan is by no means ren-
dered as an open and liberal group, but it is rendered nevertheless as a typically
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